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KCSA試験の準備方法｜効率的なKCSA最新問題試験｜便利なLinux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate必殺問題集
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>> KCSA最新問題 <<
KCSA必殺問題集、KCSA試験番号
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Linux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate 認定 KCSA 試験問題 (Q47-Q52):
質問 # 47
A Kubernetes cluster tenant can launch privileged Pods in contravention of therestricted Pod Security Standardmandated for cluster tenants and enforced by the built-inPodSecurity admission controller.
The tenant has full CRUD permissions on the namespace object and the namespaced resources. How did the tenant achieve this?
- A. By using higher-level access credentials obtained reading secrets from another namespace.
- B. The scope of the tenant role means privilege escalation is impossible.
- C. By deleting the PodSecurity admission controller deployment running in their namespace.
- D. By tampering with the namespace labels.
正解：D
解説：
* ThePodSecurity admission controllerenforces Pod Security Standards (Baseline, Restricted, Privileged)based on namespace labels.
* If a tenant has full CRUD on the namespace object, they canmodify the namespace labelsto remove or weaken the restriction (e.g., setting pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=privileged).
* This allows privileged Pods to be admitted despite the security policy.
* Incorrect options:
* (A) is false - namespace-level access allows tampering.
* (C) is invalid - PodSecurity admission is not namespace-deployed, it's a cluster-wide admission controller.
* (D) is unrelated - Secrets from other namespaces wouldn't directly bypass PodSecurity enforcement.
References:
Kubernetes Documentation - Pod Security Admission
CNCF Security Whitepaper - Admission control and namespace-level policy enforcement weaknesses.
質問 # 48
Why does the defaultbase64 encodingthat Kubernetes applies to the contents of Secret resources provide inadequate protection?
- A. Base64 encoding is vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
- B. Base64 encoding is not supported by all Secret Stores.
- C. Base64 encoding relies on a shared key which can be easily compromised.
- D. Base64 encoding does not encrypt the contents of the Secret, only obfuscates it.
正解：D
解説：
* Kubernetes stores Secret data asbase64-encoded stringsin etcd by default.
* Base64 is not encryption- it is a simple encoding scheme that merelyobfuscatesdata for transport and storage. Anyone with read access to etcd or the Secret manifest can easily decode the value back to plaintext.
* For actual protection, Kubernetes supportsencryption at rest(via encryption providers) and external Secret management (Vault, KMS, etc.).
References:
Kubernetes Documentation - Secrets
CNCF Security Whitepaper - Data protection section: highlights that base64 encoding does not protect data and encryption at rest is recommended.
質問 # 49
In a Kubernetes cluster, what are the security risks associated with using ConfigMaps for storing secrets?
- A. Storing secrets in ConfigMaps does not allow for fine-grained access control via RBAC.
- B. Storing secrets in ConfigMaps can expose sensitive information as they are stored in plaintext and can be accessed by unauthorized users.
- C. ConfigMaps store sensitive information in etcd encoded in base64 format automatically, which does not ensure confidentiality of data.
- D. Using ConfigMaps for storing secrets might make applications incompatible with the Kubernetes cluster.
正解：B
解説：
* ConfigMaps are explicitly not for confidential data.
* Exact extract (ConfigMap concept):"A ConfigMap is an API object used to store non- confidential data in key-value pairs."
* Exact extract (ConfigMap concept):"ConfigMaps are not intended to hold confidential data. Use a Secret for confidential data."
* Why this is risky:data placed into a ConfigMap is stored as regular (plaintext) string values in the API and etcd (unless you deliberately use binaryData for base64 content you supply). That means if someone has read access to the namespace or to etcd/APIServer storage, they can view the values.
* Secrets vs ConfigMaps (to clarify distractor D):
* Exact extract (Secret concept):"By default, secret data is stored as unencrypted base64- encoded strings.You canenable encryption at restto protect Secrets stored in etcd."
* This base64 behavior applies toSecrets, not to ConfigMap data. Thus optionDis incorrect for ConfigMaps.
* About RBAC (to clarify distractor A):Kubernetesdoessupport fine-grained RBAC forboth ConfigMaps and Secrets; the issue isn't lack of RBAC but that ConfigMaps arenotdesigned for confidential material.
* About compatibility (to clarify distractor C):Using ConfigMaps for secrets doesn't make apps
"incompatible"; it's simplyinsecureand against guidance.
References:
Kubernetes Docs -ConfigMaps: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/configmap/ Kubernetes Docs -Secrets: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/secret/ Kubernetes Docs -Encrypting Secret Data at Rest: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster
/encrypt-data/
Note: The citations above are from the official Kubernetes documentation and reflect the stated guidance that ConfigMaps are fornon-confidentialdata, while Secrets (with encryption at rest enabled) are forconfidential data, and that the 4C's map todefense in depth.
質問 # 50
Which information does a user need to verify a signed container image?
- A. The image's SHA-256 hash and the public key of the signing authority.
- B. The image's digital signature and the private key of the signing authority.
- C. The image's digital signature and the public key of the signing authority.
- D. The image's SHA-256 hash and the private key of the signing authority.
正解：C
解説：
* Container image signing (e.g., withcosign, Notary v2) uses asymmetric cryptography.
* Verification process:
* Retrieve theimage's digital signature.
* Validate the signature with thepublic keyof the signer.
* Exact extract (Sigstore Cosign Docs):
* "Verification of an image requires the signature and the signer's public key. The signature proves authenticity and integrity."
* Why others are wrong:
* A & B: The private key is only used by the signer, never shared.
* C: The hash alone cannot prove authenticity without the digital signature.
References:
Sigstore Cosign Docs: https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview
質問 # 51
Which of the following statements regarding a container run with privileged: true is correct?
- A. A container run with privileged: true within a cluster can access all Secrets used within that cluster.
- B. A container run with privileged: true within a Namespace can access all Secrets used within that Namespace.
- C. A container run with privileged: true has no additional access to Secrets than if it were run with privileged: false.
- D. A container run with privileged: true on a node can access all Secrets used on that node.
正解：C
解説：
* Setting privileged: true grants a containerelevated access to the host node, including access to host devices, kernel capabilities, and the ability to modify the host.
* However, Secrets in Kubernetes are not automatically exposedto privileged containers. Secrets are mounted into Pods only if explicitly referenced.
* Thus, being privilegeddoes not grant additional access to Kubernetes Secretscompared to a non- privileged Pod.
* The risk lies in node compromise: if a privileged container can take over the node, it could then indirectly gain access to Secrets (e.g., by reading kubelet credentials).
References:
Kubernetes Documentation - Security Context
CNCF Security Whitepaper - Pod security context and privileged container risks.
質問 # 52
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